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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court judge erroneously grant appellee's Motion to Dismiss based on a 
finding of double jeopardy? 
Standard of Review. This Court will review a trial court's conclusions as to the legal 
effect of a given set of found facts for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Nevertheless, it may still grant a trial court discretion in its application of the law to a given fact 
situation. Id. at 938-39. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee was charged by Amended Information on January 23, 2001, with (I) Possession 
of a Forged Writing, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of §76-6-502, U.C.A.; (II) Theft of 
Services, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of §76-6-409 U.C.A.; and (III) Willful Interference 
with Lawful Activities of Faculty, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of §76-8-705 U.C.A. (R. 
26.) 
In prior hearings, not subject to this appeal, on appellee's motion, Counts I and III were 
dismissed by the trial court. (R. 65, 32.) After reviewing Memoranda submitted by both parties 
and listening to oral argument on the issue of double jeopardy, the Trial Court granted appellee's 
motion to dismiss Count II, Theft of Services. (R. 57.) 
On August 29, 2000, appellee purchased a temporary UVSC parking permit for $5.00. 
The permit was valid from August 29, 2000 through September 5, 2000. (R. 76, pp. 47, 48.) At 
some point, appellee used a black marker and changed the "5" to an "8" on the parking permit. 
This was done so that on the face of the permit, it appeared that it was valid through September 
8, 2000. Appellee did this without permission from UVSC. He did not pay an additional fee to 
UVSC for the additional days he received by altering the parking permit, which fee would have 
been approximately three dollars ($3.00). (R. 76, pp. 48,60.) On September 7, 2000, the 
defendant displayed the altered pass when he parked his car in lot "Q" on the campus of UVSC. 
On September 7, 2000, Adam Johnson, a parking officer with the UVSC parking 
enforcement division, was patrolling lot "Q" and noticed the temporary parking permit hanging 
from defendant's rear view mirror. Johnson noticed that the date appeared to have been altered 
by writing in black marker over the original date. Johnson called the parking permit office to 
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verify the expiration date on the parking pass. (R. 76, pp. 49-50.) Johnson was informed that the 
permit had expired on September 5, 2000. Per University policy, defendant's car was booted. 
(R. 76, p. 51.) 
Appellee returned to his car and discovered that his car had been booted. He went to the 
parking office and paid a fine of $35 for the altered permit and a fee of $30 to have the boot 
removed. (R. 76, p. 52, 70, 71.) He was not charged for the additional days parking privilege he 
received after he altered the parking permit. (R. 76, pp. 60, 70.) The cashier in the parking 
office failed to collect the pass and failed to notify the appellee that he needed to give the pass to 
the parking officer. (R. 76, p. 124.) University parking policy is to collect the altered pass for 
record keeping purposes. (R. 76, p. 56.) 
Adam Bradley, another parking officer, was dispatched to respond to the appellee's car. 
(R. 76, p. 82.) Bradley pulled up and parked his UVSC parking services truck parallel to the 
appellee's vehicle to "immobilize" it until he could collect the permit. (R. 76, p. 85.) When 
Bradley arrived at the car, a 4-door Acura, the appellee was not there. (R. 76, p. 82.) 
As a courtesy, Bradley went ahead and removed the boot prior to the appellee's arrival 
and placed it in his truck. (R. 76, pp. 82-83.) He then waited until the appellee returned so that 
he could recover the altered parking pass from the appellee. After a few minutes, the appellee 
was dropped off by someone who then left the parking lot. (R. 76, p. 84.) 
Bradley approached the appellee and asked that the permit be given to him. The appellee 
refused, asking why Officer Bradley needed it. (R. 76, p. 86.) Officer Bradley attempted several 
times to explain the university's policy of recovering the altered permit upon removal of the boot 
to the appellee. (R. 76, p. 86-87.) The appellee refused to listen to each explanation and 
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continued to refuse to turn the permit over to Officer Bradley despite repeated requests by 
Bradley to do so. (R. 76, p. 87.) 
Bradley told the appellee that if he did not turn over the permit that Bradley would reboot 
the car. The appellee said something to the effect of, "Go ahead and try it." (R. 76, p. 88.) 
Bradley then returned to his truck, obtained a portion of the boot and began walking back 
towards the appellee's vehicle. By that point, the appellee had positioned himself near the tire to 
be booted. (R. 76, p. 88.) Because Bradley had been assaulted by a UVSC student in the past for 
booting that student's car, Bradley did not attempt to reboot the car. (R. 76, p. 80, 89.) 
Instead, Bradley contacted campus police dispatch and requested a uniformed police 
officer be dispatched to his location. (R. 76, p. 89.) Officer Andy Clements responded to 
parking lot "Q" with Officer Les Newell responding as backup. (R. 76, pp. 91, 92, 103.) After 
Officer Clements arrived on the scene and discovered what was happening, he also asked that the 
appellee turn over the parking permit to Bradley. Appellee continued to refuse, stating that he 
had paid for the altered parking pass. Appellee's attitude by this time was becoming increasingly 
"belligerent." (R. 76, p. 106.) 
At this point, Officer Newell arrived. (R. 76, pp. 107, 115.) He too, repeatedly asked that 
the appellee turn over the altered parking permit. (R. 76, p. 117). Appellee refused each time. 
Bradley again, attempted to explain the University policy to the appellee. (R. 76, p. 117). 
Appellee continued to refuse to relinquish the parking permit. Appellee was told that they 
needed the altered parking permit as evidence. Appellee responded by saying that his mother 
was an attorney, that his father was on the L.A.P.D. (R. 76, p. 98.) that he was not going to hand 
over the permit and that the situation at hand was "bullshit." (R. 76, p. 116.) 
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At that point, Officer Newell informed the appellee that he was being given a lawful 
order to turn over the parking permit and that if he failed to do so, he would be arrested. (R. 76, 
p. 118.) Rather than hand over the permit, the appellee began to tear it up. He was then arrested, 
taken into custody by Officer Newell and transported to the Utah County Jail. (R. 76, p. 119.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court erroneously found that double jeopardy had attached in regards to Count 
II of the amended information. Paying a fine to UVSC for possessing an altered parking permit 
as well as a fine for having a boot removed from appellee's vehicle did not constitute punishment 
for jeopardy purposes. As such, the City should not be prohibited from prosecuting appellee for 
Theft of Services for obtaining additional days of parking privileges that he did not pay for. 
Further, the Trial Court erred in relying on appellee's Memorandum and case law in determining 
that double jeopardy had attached. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PAYMENT OF A FINE TO UVSC FOR CRIMINAL CONDUCT IS NOT 
TANTAMOUNT TO PUNISHMENT AND WOULD NOT PREVENT CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME ACTION NOR BE PROHIBITED BY THE 
PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY. 
The City recognizes that "protection against double jeopardy is a fundamental 
constitutional right which prevents a defendant from being tried more than once for the same 
crime." State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah App. 1995) (citing U.S. Const, amend. V; 
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Utah Const, art. I, § 12). However, in some cases, civil and criminal penalties for the same 
action do not offend the principle of double jeopardy. 
In State v. Davis, a recent case on this topic, the Supreme Court of Utah considered the 
question: "when . . . [does] an in rem forfeiture constitute punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes?" State v. Davis, 972 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1998). 
Although the issue at hand more likely involves an in personam civil penalty (e.g., fine), 
rather than an in rem forfeiture, the two analyses have been unified under Hudson v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997), which the Davis Court relied on extensively in its holding. 
According to the Davis Court "Hudson . . . further narrowed the circumstances in which 
any civil penalty (whether it be a fine or a forfeiture) may constitute punishment for double 
jeopardy purposes. Hudson held that jeopardy cannot be established by a civil fine or penalty 
unless it meets the criteria of United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)." Davis at 391 
(citing Hudson, 522 U.S. 93) (emphasis added). 
The Ward test is a two step analysis used to determine whether a civil penalty rises to the 
level of punishment as to constitute jeopardy. "First, we . . . determine whether Congress, in 
establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference [civil 
or criminal] for one label or the other. Second, where Congress has indicated an intention to 
establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive 
either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention." Davis, at 391 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 
248-49). 
Furthermore, "Hudson disavowed a portion of the holding of an earlier case, United 
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989)... which had effectively held . . . [that] 
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excessiveness in relation to the nonpenal purpose assigned to the sanction [is] dispositive in 
cases where a fine or penalty was unusually disproportionate to the cost caused by the 
wrongdoer. Thus, Hudson makes it less likely that a civil penalty or fine constitutes criminal 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes." Davis, at 391. 
Applying the first prong of the Ward test to the case at hand, it can be seen that the state 
legislature clearly intended that a person harmed by another's criminal activities be allowed to 
pursue their civil remedies. It is also clear, that those proceedings and any fines or fees 
associated with them, are civil in nature. Davis, at 391 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49). In 
U.C.A. § 76-3-201.2(1) it states: "Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or 
impair the right of a person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover 
damages from the defendant in a civil action." (Emphasis added.) Further, "Criminal 
prosecutions under this section do not affect any person's right of civil action for redress for 
damages suffered as a result of any violation of this section." U.C.A. § 76-6-409.1 (emphasis 
added). Section 76-6-409.1 entitled, "Devices for theft of services - Seizure and destruction -
Civil actions for damages" clearly states that both a criminal action for theft of services may be 
pursued as well as an action for civil damages and that double jeopardy will not be applicable. 
Clearly, the state legislature has intended that someone, whether it be a person or an entity, who 
has been injured by another's criminal activities, be allowed to pursue civil remedies against an 
offender despite any criminal action that may take place against that person. 
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Because the legislature adopted identical language regarding the right to pursue civil 
remedies for Theft of Services1 as well as Retail Theft2, it is fair to assume that the intent of 
U.C.A. § 78-11-153 is equally applicable to Theft of Services cases. 
The Utah Legislature left no room for speculation that the penalty imposed under § 78-
11-15 U.C.A. was anything but a civil measure. Indeed, the section is entitled "Civil liability of 
adult for shoplifting-Damages." U.C.A. § 78-11-15 Such labeling clearly takes the penalty out 
the realm of other criminal penalties where there may be some question about double jeopardy. 
Also, the Legislature limited the civil penalty so as not to exceed $1000. The 
Legislature's limitation serves to sustain the constitutional right against double jeopardy by 
ensuring that private retailers do not create and pursue civil penalties that may be so excessive as 
to be interpreted as punitive. 
The appellee's civil fines were a total of $65. Substantially less than the civil $1000 limit 
allowed by the Legislature and substantially less than the cost of prosecuting this case. 
("[FJederal in personam cases have allowed civil penalties that amounted to many times more 
than the cost of prosecuting cases. See Rex Trailer, 350 U.S. at 154; Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. at 
548-49." Davis, at 392.) Appellee paid a fine of $30 for altering the permit and $35 for the 
1
 U.C.A. 76-6-409.1(4) 
2
 U.C.A 76-6-608(2) 
3
 An adult who wrongfully takes merchandise by any means, including but not limited to, 
concealment or attempted concealment in any manner, either on or off the premises of the 
merchant, with a purpose to deprive a merchant of merchandise or to avoid payment for 
merchandise, or both, is liable in a civil action, in addition to actual damages, for a penalty to the 
merchant in the amount of the retail price of the merchandise not to exceed $1,000, plus an 
additional penalty as determined by the court of not less than $100 nor more than $500, plus 
court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
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removal of the boot. He paid no amount of fine for the additional days of parking he wrongfully 
obtained from UVSC. Such a sum is obviously not several times more than a cost of 
"prosecuting cases." Thus, the second prong of Ward has been met and double jeopardy has not 
attached. Davis, at 391 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED COUNT II OF THE 
INFORMATION BY RELYING ON ARGUMENTS SET FORTH BY APPELLEE. 
From the Trial Court Judge's ruling, it is clear that he was persuaded by appellee's 
Motion to Dismiss and by his Reply to the City's Response, ("...prepare appropriate Findings 
and Conclusions and an Order consistent with the defendant's Memorandum in support of the 
Motion." R. 57, Emphasis added.) Defense counsel argued that Brunner v. Collection Division, 
945 P.2d 687 (Utah 1997) is the "seminal" Utah decision that is "on point" on this issue. 
Brunner is not "on point" and should have played no part in the Trial Judge's ruling. 
In Brunner, the Utah State Tax Commission ("the Commission") had assessed against the 
defendant, taxes and penalties of $142,884 under the Drug Stamp Tax Act for possession of 
20,185 grams of marijuana without the appropriate stamps affixed to the marijuana. Subsequent 
to the imposition of the fine, the Salt Lake County Attorney's office filed a three-count 
information charging the defendant with various felony offenses, including possession of the 
marijuana. Defendant petitioned the Commission for a prehearing conference to prepare for a 
formal hearing. Id. at 688. Prior to that hearing, defendant plead guilty in the criminal case and 
was sentenced. Two years after his sentence, another prehearing conference was held before the 
Commission where the defendant filed a motion for summary judged stating that imposing the 
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tax would violate the Double Jeopardy clause. The Commission denied defendant's motion after 
which the appeal was taken. Id. at 689. 
On appeal, both parties stipulated that the Commission hearing from which Brunner 
sought review was a formal adjudicative proceeding. Id. at 689. The Court found that jeopardy 
attached in the Commission proceeding when the formal hearing convened and they began taking 
evidence. Id. As for the criminal action, jeopardy had clearly attached and under double 
jeopardy standards, the Commission's subsequent actions clearly violated the standard against 
double jeopardy.. 
The State Tax Commission is empowered with adjudicative capabilities. They hold 
formal adjudicative hearings. They can issue subpoenas, depose witnesses and administer oaths. 
U.C.A. § 59-1-210 (16-18). From the Brunner case, it is obvious that at such proceedings, 
jeopardy can attach. Brunner 945 P.d at 691. 
In this case, there was no similar administrative proceeding. Unlike the Tax Commission 
which is empowered to conduct its own hearings and levy fines for violations of state law, UVSC 
has no such power. They can only assess fines for violations of their own internal policies. In 
order to enforce a violation of law, they must turn to a prosecuting agency. In this case, the 
appellee merely paid a fine. It cannot be argued that presenting oneself to a cashier and paying a 
fine is the equivalent of an administrative or criminal proceeding where evidence is presented 
and to which jeopardy can be attached. 
The remainder of the Brunner case essentially dealt with the issue of illegally possessing 
the controlled substance and how a person was only taxed for such illegal possession. Brunner, 
945 P.2d at 690, 691. The same issue of "illegal possession" that was before the Tax 
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Commission was the basis of the criminal action pursued by the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
office. Id. at 687. That is not the case in regards to the Theft of Services charge. 
Appellee Fernandez paid a fine for the removal of the boot and for the forged parking 
pass. He was never assessed a fine for failing to pay for the additional days of parking he 
wrongfully obtained from UVSC. He was never charged the fee for those additional days of 
parking he wrongfully obtained from UVSC. The only way Brunner would apply to the Theft of 
Services charge is if the appellee had also been charged some fine for the additional days of 
parking. That has never happened. Therefore, Brunner is inapplicable to the facts of this count 
of the Information and the Trial Court erred in relying on its holding in dismissing Count II of the 
Amended Information. 
CONCLUSION 
The legislature has made it very clear that those harmed by another's criminal actions 
should be allowed to pursue their civil remedies despite a criminal prosecution. From statute, it 
is very clear that the legislature intended for those harmed through the various forms of statutory 
theft be allowed to pursue their civil remedies. The fact that UVSC chose to assess and collect a 
fine from appellee for altering the permit and having the boot removed does not prohibit a 
subsequent criminal prosecution for appellee's parking in lot "Q" without paying for the 
additional days. Because the requirements of Ward have been met, double jeopardy has not 
attached and the appellee's motion should not have been granted. Further, the Trial Court erred 
in relying on Brunner in concluding that double jeopardy had attached. 
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Therefore, the appellant respectfully requests that the Trial Court's Order of Dismissal of 
Count II, Theft of Services, be vacated and this case be remanded back to the Trial Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this Order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of May, 2002. 
Robert J. Church 
Orem City Prosecutor 
/ / / / 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OREM DEPARTMENT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF OREM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAMERON MICHAEL FERNANDEZ, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION TO DISMISS CHARGE OF 
THEFT OF SERVICES COUNT II OF 
AMENDED INFORMATION 
CASE NO. 001201656 
JUDGE JON C. BACKLUND 
1. 
2. 
Pursuant to Defendant's motion to dismiss Count II of the Amended Information, 
Faculty, the Court hereby enters the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The underlying facts relevant to this motion are essentially not in dispute, and are set 
forth in memoranda from counsel. 
The Court finds that prior to being charged with theft of services for illegal parking in 
the above entitled matter, Defendant was issued two citations by the State at Utah 
Valley State College. 
Defendant paid $60 pursuant to the two citations issued to him for illegal parking. 
In light of the above findings, the Court does not address the additional arguments of 
Defendant. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Fundamental principles of Double Jeopardy bar prosecution of the charge of theft of 
services in the above entitled matter. 
Count II of the amended information should be dismissed. 
3. 
4. 
1 
ORDER 
1. Count II of the amended information, Theft of services, a class B misdemeanor, is 
hereby ordered dismissed. 
BY THE COURT this 2 ^ day of August, 2001. 
Judge^on C. Backlund 
Fourai District Court 
Approval as to form: 
Robert Church, Esq. 
Orem City Attorney's Office 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing to 
Attorney's Office, 56 North State Street, Orem, Utah, 84057, this J 6 ^ d a y 
the Orem City 
o f iW^ ,_200p . 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT - OREM COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OREM CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAMERON MICHAEL FERNANDEZ, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION 
Case No: 001201656 
Judge: JOHN C. BACKLUND 
Date: 08/10/2001 
Clerk: leslieac 
The Court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss Count II of the 
Amended Information THEFT OF SERVICES, based on double jeopardy. 
Counsel for the defendant is requested to prepare appropriate 
Findings and Conclusions and an Order consistent with the 
defendant's Memorandum in support of the Motion. Having thus ruled 
the Court does not reach the additional grounds argued by the 
defendant of selective prosecution and the unconstitutional 
application of the statute. The Court also schedules Oral Arguments 
•.on Count I on the issue of whether or not the Defendant did, under 
the facts agreed upon by both parties possess a forged writing with 
the intent to defraud, by refusing to surrender the parking pass 
after being directed to do so and before he tore up the pass. 
cc: Orem City Attorney Randall K. Spencer 
Page 1 (last) AddurdwOtf 
<h ) 
SS 
Randall K. Spencer (6992) 
ABBOTT, SPENCER, & SMITIJ LLC 
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CASE NO. 001201656 
JUDGE JON C. BACKLUND 
COMES NOW, the Defendant above named, by and through his counsel of record, 
RANDALL K. SPENCER, and hereby moves the Court pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, to dismiss Count I of the charges in this matter based on the fact that 
trial or prosecution violates double jeopardy under both the U.S and Utah Constitutions. This 
motion is supported by the attached memorandum of points and authorities. 
Respectfully submitted this. l°\ day of Mnr*h\ ,2001. 
Snaall K. Spencer 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Orem City 
Attorney's Office, 56 North State Street, Orem, Utah, 84057, this &> day of/fo,^ .2001. 
A&WiW C 
Randall K. Spencer (6992) 
ABBOTT, SPENCER, & SMITH LLC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
39 West 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone 377-9696 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF OREM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAMERON MICHAEL FERNANDEZ, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT I 
BASED ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
CASE NO. 001201656 
JUDGE JON C. BACKLUND 
COMES NOW, the Defendant above named, by and through his counsel of record, 
RANDALL K. SPENCER, and submits the following memorandum in support of Defendant's 
motion to dismiss Count I of the Information based on double jeopardy. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 7, 2000, Mr. Fernandez was a student at Utah Valley State College 
(UVSC)inOrem,Utah. 
2. Mr. Fernandez was issued a temporary UVSC parking permit which expired on 
September 5,2000. 
3. Defendant altered the permit, changing the 05 to 08 to enable him to park his car and 
get to class on time that day. 
4. While in class, Defendant was issued citations for parking illegally (#OOG3064 & 
#OOG3065), the first for altering the temporary permit and the second as an impound 
fine. In addition, Defendant's car was booted so it could not be moved. 
5. Upon discovering the citations, Defendant went to the parking building on campus and 
paid the fines associated with the alteration of the permit ($35.00 for altering the 
permit, and $30.00 for a impound fee). Defendant was told that the boot would be 
removed and he was free to move the car. At no time was Defendant asked to 
surrender his parking permit nor was he given a copy of UVSC Parking Regulations. 
6. Upon returning to his car, Defendant found that the boot had been removed. However, 
his vehicle was blocked by a UVSC vehicle. Adam Bradley, a UVSC employee, had 
removed the boot and was standing nearby. 
7. Bradley approached Defendant who was now sitting in his vehicle and told Defendant 
that he must hand over the expired parking permit before he would be allowed to 
leave. Defendant asked Bradley for an explanation as to why he must hand over the 
permit. Defendant was told that it was UVSC policy that he must hand over the permit 
or his car would be rebooted by Bradley. 
8. When Bradley threatened to call police, Defendant told him to "go ahead." Bradley 
did call for an officer and shortly thereafter, Officer Clements of the UVSC Police 
Force arrived along with a parking officer. 
9. Defendant was told that by Officer Clements that he must return the permit. 
Defendant informed Clements that if there was a regulation stating that he must return 
the permit, he would return it but he would like to be shown the regulation. The only 
reason given by Clements to return the parking permit was "Because I said so." 
10. Officer Newell then arrived, approached, and commanded Defendant to turn over the 
permit in question. In response, Defendant tried to explain that he had paid his fines 
and would like to know what regulation was forced Defendant to give up the old 
permit. In a threatening manner, Newell stated it was a direct police order that 
Fernandez surrender the permit immediately. Defendant tore the permit in half and 
handed it to Newell 
11. At this point, Defendant was handcuffed and placed under arrest. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Rule of Double Jeopardy States That Defendants Can Not be Punished Twice for 
the Same Conduct. 
Defendant was originally charged with Willful Interference with the Lawful Activities 
of Faculty, and Possession of a Forged Writing. On January 23, 2001, the State amended the 
complaint to add Theft of Services, a class B misdemeanor. Defendant made, what amounts to, 
this same motion to this Court.prior to the amending of the complaint, in which the Court largely 
concurred with Defendant's argument. The same arguments and principles previously argued 
relative the the forgery charge apply to the facts of the present case, and Count II: Theft of 
Services is barred by principles of double jeopardy. 
Although in regards,to the forgery charge, the Court allowed the State to maintain the 
cause of action for forgery for the time after the demand was made to Mr. Fernandez to 
surrender his altered parking pass, and he refused to do so, the principles on which the cpurt 
relied do not apply in regards to theft of services. Specifically, the testimony presented at the 
evidentiary hearing was that the cost to park for a day where Mr. Fernandez parked was $ 1.00. 
Notwithstanding the very short delay (minutes according to the testimony at the hearing) which 
occurred because of Mr. Fernandez's initial unwillingness to hand over the parking permit, there 
was no additional damage done to UVSC. They had already ticketed him and fined him $65.00 
because of the alleged loss of $ 1.00, and the momentary delay would not have, and did not result 
in a further loss of services to UVSC. Whereas in relation to the forgery charge, the court 
reasoned that a jury could conclude that Mr. Fernandez's initial refusal to turn over the altered 
parking permit could constitute a new possession with intent to defraud in the future. Therefore, 
the following double jeopardy arguments should result in a complete dismissal of the theft of 
services charge unlike the partial limitation on the forgery charge. 
The constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy affords a criminal defendant three 
separate protections by prohibiting: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; 
(2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for 
the same offense. State v. Miller. 747 P.2d 440 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). As the U.S. Supreme 
Court explained: 
The Double Jeopardy Clause, whose application to this new context we are called upon 
to consider, provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb." (quoting U.S. Const., Amdt. 5). This protection applies both 
to successive punishments and to successive prosecutions for the same criminal offense." 
U.S. v. Dixon. 509 U.S. 688. 695-696 (1993) (quoting Bloom v. Illinois. 391 U.S. 194 at 201). 
Under both the Utah and U.S. Constitutions, once a defendant has been punished by the State, 
Defendants can not be punished a second time for the same conduct or crime. 
Double jeopardy is also barred by the Utah Constitution in Article I, Section 12, which 
forbids "any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Punishing a Defendant twice 
for one course of conduct is also specifically barred by statute in U.C. A. 76-1 -403 which states 
in part: 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of'a single 
criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out 
of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(ii) resulted in conviction; 
U.C. A. 76-1-405 further clarifies when a second prosecution is not barred by double jeopardy: 
A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not be barred under the following 
circumstances: 
(1) The former prosecution was procured by the defendant without the 
knowledge of the prosecuting attorney bringing the subsequent prosecution and 
with intent to avoid the sentence that might otherwise be imposed; or 
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt held invalid in a 
subsequent proceeding on writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis, or similar 
collateral attack. 
II. The Issuance of Citations by UVSC Police and the Payment of Fines Based on 
Citations Constitutes Criminal Jeopardy. 
Under Utah law, UVSC Police Officers are given state-wide jurisdiction to act as police 
officers, including the discretion to arrest, charge crimes, or issue citations as part of their duties. 
U.C. A. 53B-3-104. UVSC traffic regulations provide that "UVSC College Police have authority 
to issue citations for violations of the Utah Annotated Code as well as UVSC Parking 
Violations." UVSC Traffic Regulation §500.00. Statewide, police officers routinely issue 
citations based on both Utah state law and local regulations. These charges represent Class C 
misdemeanors and are punishable either by state statute or by penalties decided by local political 
entities. The right to pass local parking violations is given UVSC (and all other state and private 
universities) by statute, specifically U.C.A. §76-8-701. See UVSC Traffic Regulations 
§1200.00: 
Enforcement: The College President and Vice President for College Relations and 
Campus support has the authority to make regulations concerning parking, traffic, and 
traffic-related matters. As outlined in Utah Code §53B-3-101 [sic] through 103 and 76-
8-701. 
Chapter 3 of Title 53B of the Utah Code is the correct statute that gives UVSC power to enforce 
traffic and parking violations. U.C.A. 53B-3-107 states it is a violation to "park a vehicle upon 
any property owned or controlled by a state institution of higher education contrary to posted 
signs authorized by the published rules and regulations of the institution...." U.C.A. 53B-3r 108 
makes parking violations on state institution of higher learning a misdemeanor: "A violation of 
this chapter is a misdemeanor." 
Although U.C.A. 53B-3-108 makes parking violations on campuses criminal 
misdemeanors, it is true that parking violators do not face the possibility of imprisonment when 
issued UVSC parking citations. However, the overriding factor used by courts in deciding 
whether jeopardy attaches in cases where the state fines citizens is whether the citizen receives 
"punishment." Brunner v. Collection Division, 945 P.2d 687,691 (Utah 1997). In Brunner. the 
Utah Supreme Court ruled that the drug stamp tax act was unconstitutional because it violated 
double jeopardy. The Utah Supreme Court specifically ruled that at the moment the tax 
commission began a formal hearing concerning the drug tax stamp, jeopardy attached to the 
criminal episode. Id. at 691. So too, anytime police officers issue citations and begin 
proceedings that end in a citizen being punished, whether that punishment be financial or penal, 
jeopardy attaches. This includes the issuance and payment of citations such as those issued in 
the present case. 
III. Further Prosecution Based on the Same Conduct, Would Constitute Double Jeopardy. 
On September 7,2000, Defendant was issued two citations by UVSC Officer Adam D. 
Johnson. According to Officer Johnson, "I came upon a vehicle that contained one of the 
school's temporary parking permits hanging from the rear view mirror. I noticed that the date 
on the permit looked as if it had been altered by writing in black marker over the original date." 
Utah Valley State College Police Department, Voluntary Statement of Adam Johnson at 1. In 
Officer Johnson's own words, he made a decision to issue Mr. Fernandez two citations based 
on the altered parking permit (UVSC citations #OOG3064 & #OOG3065) as provided in 
UVSC Traffic Regulation §§ 200.05; 500.00. Clearly Officer Johnson recognized that the 
permit had been altered, the vehicle was parking illegally, and issued the citations based on 
those facts. Mr. Fernandez immediately went to the Parking Office and made an appearance 
as instructed. He was ordered to pay fines in the amount of $65.00, total. See attached copies 
of receipts. 
As a result, Defendant was charged and punished by the State of Utah for the act of 
parking illegally on September 7, 2000. The State of Utah, through the actions of UVSC 
Officer Johnson and UVSC Parking Office, made a choice, i.e., to charge and punish Defendant 
for two violations in this matter (UVSC citations #OOG3064 & #OOG3065). It is a well-
settled legal principle, that once the State elects to charge a defendant and as a result the 
defendant is punished, the State is precluded from revisiting the course of events to add new 
charges. Specifically, the question is not whether the State couldhave charged another specific 
crime based on the facts. The legal and moral principle is that once the state punishes a citizen 
for a course of conduct, it loses the opportunity to revisit the matter to add new charges. 
In this case, Defendant had been charged and punished by the State of Utah. Officer 
Johnson's statement makes it clear, he issued the citations specifically because Defendant parked 
illegally, using an altered parking permit. Mr. Fernandez paid the fine levied by the State for his 
conduct. Therefore, jeopardy has attached and Mr. Fernandez can not be placed in jeopardy a 
second time by the State. 
At the time of his arrest, Mr. Fernandez was charged with evidence tampering, a 2nd 
degree felony. The Utah County Attorney refused to proceed on those charges and referred the 
matter to the City of Orem for any further prosecution. However, it is important to point out that 
the charge Mr. Fernandez was originally arrested on was based on conduct unconnected to 
possessing or altering the parking permit. It was based on the allegation that Defendant tore the 
permit before handing it to Officer Clement, actions that occurred after he had paid his fine for 
altering the permit. By charging Defendant with Theft of Services, the City of Orem has chosen 
to charge Mr. Fernandez a third time for parking in a UVSC parking space with an altered 
parking permit. This clearly violates the double jeopardy doctrine of both the U.S. and State of 
Utah Constitution and U.C.A. §U.C.A. 76-1-403. 
Finally, Utah case law applies in circumstances where multiple charges can arise from 
a singe criminal episode. Specifically, further prosecution is prohibited by State v. ShondeL 453 
P.2d 146 (Utah 1969) (where two statutes interdict the same conduct, but impose different 
penalties, the violator is entitled to the lesser punishment) and State v. Helmuth. 598 P.2d 333 
(Utah 1979) (when an individual's conduct can be construed to be a violation of two overlapping 
statutes, the more specific statute governs). Defendant's vehicle was booted under UVSC 
Parking Regulations §200.5 which states, "ALTERATION OF THE DATE ON THE 
TEMPORARY PERMIT, MAY RESULT IN VEHICLE BEING BOOTED AND 
ADDITIONAL FINES." (capitalization in original). Given the facts in this case, this clearly is 
a more specific regulation then the much more nebulous Theft of Services statute and therefore, 
Helmuth applies. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on Dismiss Based on Unconstitutionality 
of U.C.A. § 76-6-409 for a detailed discussion of the vagueness of this statute under the facts of 
this case. 
The Shondel argument is even more persuasive. It is important to understand that the 
State is alleging that parking illegally in a UVSC parking space constitutes Theft of Services1. 
'Defendant does not concede and argues in his Motion to Dismiss Based on the 
Unconstitutionality of U.C.A. 76-6-409 that use of a parking stall can not be considered 
Theft of Services. 
However, Defendant had already been punished for parking his car illegally when the UVSC 
traffic office fined Defendant $65.00. As a result, the State has already proscribed Theft of 
Services (parking illegally), by charging Defendant under UVSC Traffic Regulation §§ 200.05, 
for which Defendant had already been punished. See State v. Gomez 772 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 
1986) ("The criminal laws must be written so that there are significant differences between 
offenses and so that the exact same conduct is not subject to different penalties depending on 
which of two statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to charge. To allow that would be to allow 
a form of arbitrariness that is foreign to our system of law"). In this case, the prosecution has 
charged and punished Defendant for parking illegally. The State is attempting to prosecute 
Defendant again by alleging thatparking illegally constitutes Theft of Services. Shondel applies 
in this situation and requires that Defendant receive the lesser penalty for parking illegally, a 
penalty Defendant has already paid in full. In fact, as stated above, testimony at the evidentiary 
established that the cost to park in the subject lot for a day was $1.00, and Mr. Fernande? has 
already paid UVSC fines totaling $65.00 (65 times the alleged loss of service which is a 
significant punishment). 
In summary, the charge of Theft of Services is constitutionally barred by the doctrine 
of double jeopardy. In addition, Utah case law clearly mandates that Mr. Fernandez can not 
also be punished a second time when he was already properly punished for the lesser more 
specific offense of parking illegally with an altered permit. This court has already agreed with 
Defendant's analysis in an earlier motion. 
In addition to the arguments made above, the "law of the case doctrine" also requires that 
Count II: Theft of Services, be treated in a similar manner as the law the Court has established 
relative to the Forgery charge. Except however, the potential future conduct which is 
contemplated in the Forgery statute does not apply to the theft of services statute, and therefore 
the delay in returning the altered permit cannot be construed as a new and separate act of theft 
of services. In otherwords, relative to forgery, possession of a forged document with the intent 
to defraud in the future can constitute a crime; whereas, the crime of theft of services must be 
based on conduct which has already been committed, and there is no break in the continuous 
alleged criminal episode of the act which the city alleges constitutes theft of services to justify 
a new and separate act after the initial refusal to return the parking permit. 
CONCLUSION 
Calling parking illegally by a different name (Theft of Services) does not change the 
fact that jeopardy has already attached to the conduct of Defendant the moment he paid his 
parking fine. Because Mr. Fernandez has already been punished by the State of Utah for the 
same conduct in the same criminal episode, further prosecution is barred by the doctrine of 
double jeopardy under both the U.S. and Utah Constitutions and by Utah case law in Shondel 
and Helmuth. 
For all the above reasons, Defendant asks the court to grant this Motion to Dismiss. 
Respectfully submitted this / 1 day of March, 2001. 
'Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing Motion to 
Dismiss to the Orem City Attorney's Office, 56 North State Street, Orem, Utah, 84057, this 
^ day of M*rGk 200 L 
(/i^ 
Robert J. Church (7373) 
CITY OF OREM 
56 North State Street 
Orem,Utah 84057 
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CITY OF OREM, 
/ 
Plaintiff, 
CAMERON MICHAEL FERNANDEZ, 
Defendant. 
Deput\|gfegfcoNSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT 1 
BASED ON DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY AND ORDER 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION 
Case No: 9912-1432 
Judge John C. Backlund 
COMES NOW the City of Orem ("the City") and hereby responds to the defendant's 
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT ONE BASED ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY. In his MOTION, 
the defendant moved this court pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to 
dismiss the Theft of Services charge based upon a claim that trial or prosecution would violate 
double jeopardy under both the United States and Utah Constitutions. (Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss at 1-1.) This argument is without merit. 
The City contends that the fines paid by the defendant to UVSC for the altered permit and 
the boot removal, were civil in nature and not criminal. As such, there would be no double 
jeopardy violation. The City further contends that the defendant did not adequately carry his 
burden in moving this court to dismiss the Theft of Services on the grounds of double jeopardy. 
Aidcx\4atv\ & 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. As a service to its students, faculty and visitors, UVSC provides parking lots and 
spaces. Lot "Q" where the defendant was parked, is a parking lot where a person may only park 
after purchasing a parking permit. 
2. On August 29, 2000, defendant purchased a temporary UVSC parking permit for 
$5.00. The permit was valid from August 29, 2000 through September 5, 2000. 
3. At some point, defendant used a black marker and changed the "5" to an "8M on the 
parking permit. This was done so that on the face of the permit, it appeared that it was valid 
through September 8, 2000. Defendant did this without permission from UVSC. He did not pay 
an additional fee to UVSC for the additional days on the parking permit. 
4. Upon altering the parking pass, on September 7, 2000, the defendant displayed it when 
he parked his car in lot "Q" on the campus of UVSC. 
5. The value of parking in a UVSC parking stall on a temporary parking permit is $ 1.00 
per day. By altering the parking pass from September 5,2000 to September 8,2000, had the 
defendant not been caught, he would have deprived UVSC of $3.00 in parking revenue. 
6. That on September 7, 2000, Adam Johnson, a parking officer with the UVSC parking 
enforcement division, was patrolling lot "Q" and noticed the temporary parking permit hanging 
from defendant's rear view mirror. Johnson noticed that the date appeared to have been altered 
by writing in black marker over the original date. Per department procedure, Johnson called the 
parking permit office to verify the expiration on the parking pass. Johnson was informed that the 
permit had expired on September 5, 2000. Again, according to University policy, defendant's car 
was "booted." 
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7. Defendant returned to his car, discovered that his car had been booted. He went to the 
parking office and paid a fine of $35 for the altered permit and a fee of $30 to have the boot 
removed. The fines paid did not pay for the two additional days of parking the defendant had 
obtained by altering the temporary parking permit. Hence, UVSC was deprived $2.00 in parking 
revenue. 
8. The cashier in the parking office failed to collect the pass and failed to notify the 
defendant that he needed to return it to the parking officer. 
9. University parking policy is to collect the altered pass for record keeping purposes. 
10. Adam Bradley, another parking officer, responded to the defendant's car. Bradley 
pulled up and parked his UVSC parking services truck parallel to the defendant's vehicle. Even 
though the effect was to block defendant's car in the stall, the purpose for parking there was to 
facilitate in the quick and immediate removal of the boot. 
11. When Bradley arrived at the car, a 4-door Acura, the defendant was not there. 
12. As a courtesy, Bradley went ahead and removed the boot prior to the defendant's 
arrival and placed it in his truck. He then waited until the defendant returned so that he could 
recover the altered parking pass from the defendant. 
13. After a few minutes, the defendant was dropped off by someone who then left the 
parking lot. 
14. Bradley approached the defendant and asked that the permit be given to him. The 
defendant refused, asking why Officer Bradley needed it. Officer Bradley attempted several 
times to explain the university's policy of recovering the altered permit upon removal of the boot 
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to the defendant. The defendant refused to listen to the explanation and continued to refuse to 
turn the permit over to Officer Bradley despite repeated requests by Bradley. 
15. Bradley told the defendant that if he did not turn over the permit that Bradley would 
reboot the car. The defendant said to go ahead and try it. 
16. Bradley then returned to his truck, obtained a portion of the boot and began walking 
back towards the defendant's vehicle. By that point, the defendant had positioned himself near 
the tire. Because Bradley had been assaulted by a UVSC student in the past for booting that 
student's car, Bradley did not attempt to reboot the car. 
17. At that point, Bradley contacted campus police dispatch and requested a uniformed 
police officer be dispatched to his location. 
18. Officer Andy Clements responded to parking lot "Q" with Officer Les Newell 
responding as backup. 
19. After Officer Clements arrived on the scene and discovered what was happening, he 
asked several times that the defendant turn over the parking permit to Bradley. Defendant 
continued to refuse, stating that he had paid for it, meaning the altered parking pass. Defendant's 
attitude by this time was becoming increasingly belligerent. 
20. At this point, Officer Newell arrived. He too, asked that the defendant turn over the 
altered parking permit several times. Defendant refused. Bradley again, attempted to explain the 
University policy to the defendant. Defendant continued to refuse to relinquish the parking 
permit. 
21. Defendant was told that they needed the altered parking permit as evidence. 
Defendant responded by saying that his mother was an attorney, that his father was on the 
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L.A.P.D. that he was not going to hand over the permit and that the situation at hand was 
"bullshit" 
22. At that point, Officer Newell informed the defendant that he was being given a 
lawful order to turn over the parking permit and that if he failed to do so, he would be arrested. 
23. Rather than hand over the permit, the defendant began to tear it up. 
24. He was then taken into custody by Officer Newell. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PENALTIES; CIVIL AND CRIMINAL IN NATURE DO NOT NECESSARILY 
VIOLATE DOUBLE JEOPARDY. 
The City agrees that "protection against double jeopardy is a fundamental constitutional 
right which prevents a defendant from being tried more than once for the same crime." State v. 
Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah App. 1995) (citing U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, § 
12). However, the present issue, where the defendant's actions potentially induce criminal and 
civil penalties under Utah law, does not threaten a violation of those rights. 
In State v. Davis, a recent case on this topic, the Supreme Court of Utah considered 
"when. . . [does] an in rem forfeiture constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes?" 972 
P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1998). 
Although the issue at hand more likely involves an in personam civil penalty (e.g., fine), 
rather than an in rem forfeiture, the two analyses have been unified under Hudson v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997), which the Davis Court relied on extensively in its holding. 
According to the Davis Court "Hudson . . . further narrowed the circumstances in which 
any civil penalty (whether it be a fine or a forfeiture) may constitute punishment for double 
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jeopardy purposes. Hudson held that jeopardy cannot be established by a civil fine or penalty 
unless it meets the criteria of United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248." Davis at 391 (citing 
Hudson, 522 U.S. 93) (emphasis added). 
The Ward test is a two step analysis to determine whether a civil penalty rises to the level 
of punishment as to constitute jeopardy. "First, we . . . determine whether Congress, in 
establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference [civil 
or criminal] for one label or the other. Second, where Congress has indicated an intention to 
establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive 
either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention." Davis, at 391 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 
248-49). 
Furthermore, "Hudson disavowed a portion of the holding of an earlier case, United 
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989)... which had effectively held . . . [that] 
excessiveness in relation to the nonpenal purpose assigned to the sanction [is] dispositive in 
cases where a fine or penalty was unusually disproportionate to the cost caused by the 
wrongdoer. Thus, Hudson makes it less likely that a civil penalty or fine constitutes criminal 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes." Davis, at 391. 
Applying the first prong of the Ward test to the case at hand, it can be seen that the state 
legislature clearly intended that a person harmed by another's criminal activities be allowed to 
pursue their civil remedies. Further, it is clear, that those proceedings and any fines or fees 
associated with them, be labeled civil in nature. Davis, at 391 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-
49). U.C.A. 76-3-201.2(1) states: "Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or 
impair the right of a person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover 
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damages from the defendant in a civil action." (Emphasis added.) Further, "Criminal 
prosecutions under this section do not affect any person's right of civil action for redress for 
damages suffered as a result of any violation of this section." U.C.A. 76-6-409.1, (emphasis 
added). This section, entitled, "Devices for theft of services - Seizure and destruction - Civil 
actions for damages" clearly states that both a criminal action for theft of services may be 
pursued as well as an action for civil damages and that double jeopardy will not be applicable. 
This section is identical to U.C.A 76-6-608(2)1 which allows a retail merchant to pursue civil 
damages against a shoplifter. Clearly, the state legislature has intended that someone, whether it 
be a person or an entity, who has been injured by another's criminal activities, be allowed to 
pursue civil remedies despite any criminal action that may take place. 
Because the legislature adopted identical language regarding the right to pursue civil 
remedies for Theft of Services2 as well as Retail Theft3, it is fair to argue that the intent of U.C.A. 
78-11-154 is equally applicable to Theft of Services cases. 
1
 Criminal prosecutions under this section do not affect any person's right of civil action 
for redress for damages suffered as a result of any violation of this section. U.C.A. 76-6-608(2). 
2
 U.C.A. 76-6-409.1(4) 
3
 U.C.A 76-6-608(2) 
4
 An adult who wrongfully takes merchandise by any means, including but not limited to, 
concealment or attempted concealment in any manner, either on or off the premises of the 
merchant, with a purpose to deprive a merchant of merchandise or to avoid payment for 
merchandise, or both, is liable in a civil action, in addition to actual damages, for a penalty to the 
merchant in the amount of the retail price of the merchandise not to exceed $1,000, plus an 
additional penalty as determined by the court of not less than $100 nor more than $500, plus 
court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
7 
The Utah Legislature left no room for speculation that the penalty imposed under § 78-
11-15 was anything but a civil measure. Indeed, the section was entitled "Civil liability of adult 
for shoplifting-Damages." Utah Code § 78-11-15 (1999) (emphasis added). Such labeling 
clearly takes the penalty out the realm of other criminal penalties where there may be some 
question about double jeopardy. 
Also, the Legislature limited the civil penalty so as not to exceed $1000. The 
Legislature's limitation serves to sustain the constitutional right against double jeopardy by 
ensuring that private retailers do not create and pursue civil penalties that may be so excessive as 
to be interpreted as punitive. 
The defendant's civil fines did not exceed the civil $1000 limit allowed by the 
Legislature. Furthermore, "[f]ederal in personam cases have allowed civil penalties that 
amounted to many times more than the cost of prosecuting cases. See Rex Trailer, 350 U.S. at 
154; Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. at 548-49." Davis, at 392. In this case, defendant paid a fine of 
$30 for altering the permit and $35 for the removal of the boot. Such a sum is surely not several 
times more than a cost of "prosecuting cases." Thus, the second prong of Weird has been met and 
double jeopardy has not attached. Davis, at 391 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49). 
CONCLUSION 
The legislature has made it very clear that those harmed by another's criminal actions 
should be allowed to pursue their civil remedies despite a criminal prosecution. To adopt 
defendant's argument that UVSC should not be allowed to pursue a criminal prosecution for 
Theft of Services after they have collected civil fines would preclude every merchant in this state 
from pursuing their civil remedies. From statute, it is clear that this is not the intent. Because the 
8 
requirements of Ward have been met, double jeopardy has not attached and the defendant's 
motion should be denied. 
Dated this &V^day of April, 2001. 
~$aA^ 
Robert J. Church 
Orem City Prosecutor 
/ / / / 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 70^ day of Af)d \ 2001,1 mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing to: 
Randall K. Spencer 
ABBOTT, SPENCER & SMITH, LLC 
39 West 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Fax: 375-0199 
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ORDER 
After due consideration of the defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count One Based 
on Double Jeopardy and the City of Orem's Response thereby, the Court hereby denies the 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED this day of , 2001. 
FOURTH DISTEJCT COURT 
Judge John C. Backlund 
Randall K. Spencer (6992), 
ABBOTT, SPENCER, & SMITH LLC 
Attorneys for Defendant) T 
39 West 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone 377-9696 
IN THE I FOURTH JUDICIALnDISTWC¥COURT 
'UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF-UTA'H* 
CITY OF OREM 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAMERON MICHAEL FERNANDEZ, 
Defendant. 
'Deputy Clerk 
REPLY TO PROSECUTION'S 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT I 
BASED ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
CASE NO. 001201656 
JUDGE JON C. BACKLUND 
COMES NOW, the Defendant above named, by and through his counsel of record, 
RANDALL K. SPENCER, and submits the following Answer to Plaintiffs Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Information Based on Double Jeopardy. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant affirms the facts as outlined in Defendant's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss Count I Based on Double Jeopardy (Defendant's 
Memorandum), previously submitted to this court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The City has failed to raise a cogent legal argument to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. 
The City has mis-understood the double jeopardy doctrine. As presented in Defendant's 
original motion, the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy affords a criminal 
defendant three separate protections by prohibiting: (1) a second prosecution for the same 
AA(k*AvTY\ t 
offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) 
multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Miller, 747 P.2d 440 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
In this case, it is the ban against successive punishments that is the principal in question before 
the court. 
In the City's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count 1 Based on Double 
Jeopardy and Order Denying Defendant's Motion (City's Response), the City mistakenly argues 
the principal that states can exact both a criminal and civil penalty for a single criminal course 
of conduct. This is a well-settled principal, that the City has carefully supported in it's response. 
Unfortunately, that principal has nothing to do with the present double jeopardy argument. In 
the present case, double jeopardy refers to the situation where a defendant is punished in 
separate, successive civil or criminal actions by the City for one criminal episode. The City has 
conceded that in the present case, the City is attempting to extract a criminal and civil 
punishment (for theft of services), after it has already extracted what it characterizes as a civil 
punishment (the original parking citation). City'ss Response at 8. What the City fails to 
mention or address in City's Response is that the Utah Supreme Court has already stated that 
such actions violate double jeopardy. 
The City completely ignores the seminal Utah decision that is "on point" in the present 
case, Brunner v. Collection Division. 945 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1997). As argued previously, 
in Brunner, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the drug stamp tax act was unconstitutional 
because a second punishment, even a civil punishment, violated double jeopardy. The Utah 
Supreme Court specifically ruled that at the moment the tax commission began a formal hearing 
concerning the drug tax stamp, jeopardy attached to the criminal episode. Id. at 691. As the 
Court stated: 
We reverse the Commission and hold that the Drug Stamp Tax Act is punitive and, 
thus, when imposed in connection with but separate from related criminal proceedings, 
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. 
Brunner at 691. As the Utah Supreme Court made very clear in Brunner, the City cannot exact 
a punitive civil punishment and a prior (or subsequent) separate punitive action against a 
Defendant. Such separate punitive actions by the City constitute double jeopardy. Like the 
Drug Stamp Tax Act, a parking citation is at least a quasi-criminal or punitive action taken by 
the State. This circumstance is not similar to the availability of a civil remedy against a 
shoplifter by the victim in addition to the State proceeding. 
To support it's argument, the City cites a number of U.S. Supreme Court cases, relying 
primarily on issues which are not relevant to the issue at hand. First, each U.S. Supreme Court 
case cited by the City involves the issue that combining both civil and criminal penalties in 
one action against a defendant is constitutionally permitted (e.g., civil forfeiture along with 
criminal fines and imprisonment). The cases cited by the City do not address the present issue 
of bringing multiple, separate punitive punishments against a defendant for one criminal 
episode; furthermore, in the authority cited by the City, civil forfeitures have been deemed 
purely civil in nature unlike a traffic citation issued by police officers commissioned by the 
State of Utah which is obviously criminal or at least quasi-criminal in nature. Secondly, it 
is the Utah Supreme Court that has ultimate responsibility for interpreting how double 
jeopardy principles apply in Utah courts. Even if the U.S. Supreme Court rules on double 
jeopardy, such rulings are a constitutional "bar" that states may not lower. In other words, 
Cities or States are free to provide greater protection against double jeopardy under the Utah 
Constitution then are provided under the U.S. Constitution.1 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly ruled in Brunner that separate and distinct punitive 
actions against a defendant is barred by the double jeopardy doctrine. The Court in the present 
case recognized this principle in partially granting Defendant's initial double jeopardy motion. 
The part of the motion which the court did not grant was based on the Court's conclusion that 
there was a new and separate criminal episode when Defendant refused to return the altered 
parking pass when the officer demanded such. In relation to the theft of services charge, there 
i 
Defendant does not concede that the City has shown that under the U.S. Constitution it's 
actions in the present case do not constitute double jeopardy. In fact, such is not the case, and 
the City's actions in the present situation constitutes double jeopardy under both constitutions. 
is not a new criminal episode separate and distinct from the initial act of improperly altering 
the parking pass and improperly parking in the lot which Defendant was cited for and 
punished. 
In summary, Defendant again reiterates that Officer Johnson's issuance of a citation for 
illegal parking was a choice by the City/State to punish Defendant for his actions in this 
matter. Once the City has chosen to punish a citizen for criminal actions, the City is 
constitutionally and morally prohibited from revisiting the episode to impose further civil or 
criminal punishment. 
II. The City Has Ignored Defendant's Shondel and Helmuth Arguments. 
In Defendant's Memorandum, Defendant raised the legal arguments that not only did 
double jeopardy apply, but also that the Utah Supreme Court's interpretations of the statutory 
prohibitions against multiple prosecutions for a single criminal episode also apply in the 
present case, i.e., State v. Shondel 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969) (where two statutes interdict 
the same conduct, but impose different penalties, the violator is entitled to the lesser 
punishment) and State v. Helmuth, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979) (when an individual's conduct 
can be construed to be a violation of two overlapping statutes, the more specific statute 
governs). It seems obvious that a person who parks in a lot and does not pay for it is a perfect 
illustration of a situation where the statute authorizing a parking violation is the most specific 
statute applicable to the facts rather than the Statute with a greater punishment such as theft 
of services. Defendant will not take the court's time to re-argue these points here, but refer 
the court to Defendant's Memorandum. By ignoring these arguments, Defendant submits the 
City has waived any legal position in opposition. 
CONCLUSION 
As Defendant stated in Defendant's Memorandum: 
In summary, the charge of Theft of Services is constitutionally barred by the 
doctrine of double jeopardy. In addition, Utah case law clearly mandates that Mr. 
Fernandez cannot also be punished a second time when he was already properly 
punished for the lesser more specific offense of parking illegally with an altered 
permit. This court has already agreed with Defendant's analysis in an earlier 
motion. 
Defendant's Memorandum at 9. Defendant believes the same summary is not only still 
valid, but also stands unchallenged by the City. For all the reasons set forth above, the 
Court should grant Defendant's motion to dismiss on principles of Double Jeopardy 
and/or the Shondel/Helmuth doctrine. 
Respectfully submitted this day of August, 2001. 
Randall K. Spencer 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing Motion to 
Dismiss to the Orem City Attorney's Office, 56 North State Street, Orem, Utah, 84057, this 
CI- day of / / j w i A 2001. 
Addendum "F" 
Statutes 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-210 (16-18) (1953, as amended) General powers and duties 
The powers and duties of the [State Tax] commission are as follows: 
(16) to subpoena witnesses to appear and give testimony and produce records 
relating to any matter before the commission; 
(17) to cause depositions of witnesses to be taken as in civil actions at the request 
of the commission or any party to any matter or proceeding before the 
commission; 
(18) to authorize any member or employee of the commission to administer oaths 
and affirmations in any matter or proceeding relating to the exercise of the powers 
and duties of the commission; 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.2(1) (1953, as amended) Civil action by victim for damages 
(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or impair the right of a 
person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover damages from the 
defendant in a civil action. Evidence that the defendant has paid or been ordered to pay 
restitution under this part or Section 77-18-1, may not be introduced in any civil action 
arising out of the facts or events which were the basis for the restitution. However, the 
court shall credit any restitution paid by the defendant to a victim against any judgment in 
favor of the victim in the civil action. 
3. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-409 (1953, as amended) Theft of Services 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains services which he knows are available only for 
compensation by deception, threat, force, or any other means designed to avoid the due 
payment for them. 
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over the disposition of services of another, 
to which he knows he is not entitled, he diverts the services to his own benefit or to the 
benefit of another who he knows is not entitled to them. 
(3) In this section "services" includes, but is not limited to, labor, professional service, 
public utility and transportation services, restaurant, hotel, motel, tourist cabin, rooming 
house, and like accommodations, the supplying of equipment, tools, vehicles, or trailers 
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for temporary use, telephone or telegraph service, steam, admission to entertainment, 
exhibitions, sporting events, or other events for which a charge is made. 
(4) Under this section "services" includes gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable television 
services, only if the services are obtained by threat, force, or a form of deception not 
described in Section 76-6-409.3. 
(5) Under this section "services" includes telephone services only if the services are 
obtained by threat, force, or a form of deception not described in Sections 76-6-409.5 
through 76-6-409.9. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-409.1(4) (1953, as amended) Device for theft of services ~ Seizure 
and destruction — Civil actions for damages 
(1) A person may not knowingly: 
(a) make or possess any instrument, apparatus, equipment, or device for the use 
of, or for the purpose of, committing or attempting to commit theft under Section 
76-6-409 or 76-6-409.3; or 
(b) sell, offer to sell, advertise, give, transport, or otherwise transfer to another any 
information, instrument, apparatus, equipment, or device, or any information, 
plan, or instruction for obtaining, making, or assembling the same, with intent that 
it be used, or caused to be used, to commit or attempt to commit theft under 
Section 76-6-409 or 76-6-409.3. 
(2) (a) Any information, instrument, apparatus, equipment, or device, or information, 
plan, or instruction referred to in Subsection (1) may be seized pursuant to a court order, 
lawful search and seizure, lawful arrest, or other lawful process. 
(b) Upon the conviction of any person for a violation of any provision of this 
section, any information, instrument, apparatus, equipment, device, plan, or 
instruction shall be destroyed as contraband by the sheriff of the county in which 
the person was convicted. 
(3) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) or (2) is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(4) Criminal prosecutions under this section do not affect any person's right of civil action 
for redress for damages suffered as a result of any violation of this section. 
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